Workshop "The Threshold of the Scientific Rationality": Abstracts
The Threshold of the Scientific Rationality
The impact of religious-driven world-views in scientific innovation
through the history of science
STOQ Project Workshop
Pontificia Università della Santa Croce
Rome, 19-21 November 2015
ABSTRACTS
Rethoric of the Two Books / La retorica e la pratica dei Due Libri nell’Europa moderna
Vittoria Feola (Università di Padova and Oxford University)
Lo scopo del mio intervento è di iniziare ad analizzare la retorica e la pratica dei Due Libri – il Libro di Dio e il Libro della Natura – nell’Europa moderna. Mi servirò di quattro casi di studio aventi come attori degli uomini sia cattolici che protestanti, basati in Italia, Austria, Inghilterra e Moravia nel XVII secolo. Il rapporto inscindibile tra filologia ed esperimenti di filosofia naturale che li accomuna mi permetterà di sollecitare la discussione alla fine della lettura. In particolare, intendo riflettere insieme sulle tre teorie dei rapporti scienza-fede proposte da John Hedley Brooke nel suo ormai classico “Science and Religion” (Cambridge, 1991).
The Copernican Crisis and its Aftermath in Catholic Science
Rafael A. Martínez (Pontificia Università della Santa Croce)
The Copernican revolution gave origin to the most acute crisis between religion and science, the Galileo Case, which has been used as the main argument against the possibility of their constructive collaboration. As a result, it has generally been accepted that religion can only be a force moving against innovation; tying thought to tradition and to the past.
This attitude was, in part, a consequence of interpreting the Copernican Crisis and Galileo Process as the result of an open confrontation lead by strong doctrinal positions against “dangerous” new theories. Recent developments in the history of the Galileo Case have lead to a less rigidly defined approach. A series of questions arise: was religious doctrine the deep reason for not just starting the conflict (that seems evident) but also of drawing the lines that the conflict followed? Was science as such the target of the anti-copernicans? Francesco Beretta has suggested, for example, that the harsh attitude of Urbano VIII was really aimed against the “philosophers”, a class more related with Paduan Aristotelism than to the new experimental mathematics.
To answer these questions it is not enough to address the direct testimonial records. It is more helpful trying to follow the underlying views on science and religion held by the main actors in the conflict. We also need to know what views, were held also by those working on scientific questions under the new limits imposed by religious authorities. Although from the middle of seventeenth century the barycenter of European science moved to the North and Western countries, science remained active in Catholic countries, and particularly in Italy: Benedetto Castelli, Bonaventura Cavalieri, Evangelista Torricelli, Giovanni Battista Riccioli, Giovanni Alfonso Borelli, Gian Domenico Cassini, etc. How did these Catholic scientists address the new state of affairs? Was religion an obstacle to pursue scientific research? Were they, in some way, trying to break the limits of doctrinal norms?
In the study of Scientific revolutions, including the Galileo case, Catholic scientists after Galileo have received very little attention. However, they were very active, and exploring ways of increasing scientific knowledge without falling into doctrinal conflicts. Riccioli suggested in 1638 that Copernican astronomy could not be proven false on empirical grounds. Borelli gave the first dynamical description of planetarian motion, a few years before Newton’s Principia Mathematica, making his calculations over Jupiter satellites, instead of using the orbit of the Earth. In eighteenth century, Ruđer Bošcović created a new dynamic system, anticipating some elements of recent particle physics. The study of this group of scientists will help clarify the role of religion in scientific innovation.
From Anatomy to Geology: Niels Stensen / Dall’Anatomia alla Geologia: Niels Stensen
María Ángeles Vitoria (Pontificia Università della Santa Croce)
1) L’attività di Niels Stensen come osservatorio privilegiato per capire in quale modo fattori e atteggiamenti di carattere filosofico e religioso abbiano avuto un influsso favorevole in scoperte che hanno gettato le basi di alcune branche della scienza moderna.
2) Sintesi schematica dell’iter seguito da Stensen nella sua ricerca su l’origine dei fossili.
3) Idee e atteggiamenti personali che sembrano aver guidato il suo percorso innovatore fino ad approdare alla formulazione di nuove prospettive.
Ciencia y Religión a la luz del enfrentamiento del Diseño Inteligente con el Darwinismo
Santiago Collado (Universidad de Navarra)
En los dos últimos decenios han sido motivo de debate las propuestas del movimiento conocido como “Diseño Inteligente” (DI). Para algunos el DI es un nuevo paradigma científico, para otros una nueva versión del creacionismo y, por tanto, religión. Unos defienden que se trata de una puerta por la que se abren nuevos caminos a la ciencia y, para otros, un serio obstáculo que la religión pone en el camino por el que la ciencia transita. El debate tiene elementos históricos, aunque sea una historia muy reciente, y epistemológicos. Dicho debate parece por tanto, al menos desde cierta perspectiva, un campo especialmente adecuado para estudiar la influencia mutua de ciencia y religión en nuestros días.
The First Catholic Evolutionist: St. George J. Mivart
Roscoe R. Stanyon and Francesca Bigoni (Università di Firenze)
In the history of biology little space is dedicated to St. George Mivart. He is usually only remembered for his objections to Darwin’s theory of natural selection contained in his book “Genesis of species”. Mivart had started his brilliant scientific career as a student, collaborator and friend of T. H. Huxley and initially had a good professional relation with Charles Darwin. Later he disappointed Darwin and Huxley by openly criticizing their theoretical approach and their materialistic view. The final break up was not caused by the discussion about evolution and natural selection, as usually claimed, but by divergence on eugenetic topics. His objections were unfairly minimized and ridiculed as bigotry due to his conversion to Catholicism. Despite the bitter controversy with Darwin, Mivart remained quite influential and from 1864 to 1898 he published more than 120 scientific papers dealing with biological and zoological subjects in the most important British scientific journals of his time. Mivart’s detailed anatomical works were based on evolutionary comparisons between species and communicated important, surprisingly modern, scientific interpretations. Today Mivart’s scientific and theoretical contribution to biology, primate evolution and anthropology are rarely mentioned. However, many of the concepts advanced by Mivart were later echoed in the writings of many important biologist of the 20th century. The history of biological sciences could benefit from a more thorough knowledge of Mivart’s influence.
Nella storia della biologia poco spazio è dedicato a St. George Mivart, generalmente ricordato solo per le obiezioni alla teoria di selezione naturale di Darwin contenute nel suo libro "Genesis of species”. Mivart aveva iniziato una brillante carriera scientifica come studente, collaboratore e amico di T. H. Huxley e sviluppato un'ottima relazione professionale con Charles Darwin. In seguito deluse sia Darwin che Huxley criticando apertamente il loro approccio teorico e la loro visione materialistica. La rottura definitiva avvenne tuttavia non a causa della discussione sulla selezione naturale, come generalmente affermato, ma su argomenti legati all'eugenetica. Le sue obiezioni furono ingiustamente minimizzate e ridicolizzate come atteggiamenti bigotti conseguenza della sua conversione al Cattolicesimo. Nonostante l'aspra controversia con Darwin, Mivart rimase molto influente nella sua epoca e dal 1864 al 1898 pubblicò più di 120 articoli scientifici di argomenti biologici and zoologici nelle più importanti riviste scientifiche britanniche. I dettagliati lavori anatomici di Mivart erano basati sullo studio comparativo evolutivo tra specie e comunicavano interpretazioni scientifiche importanti e per alcuni aspetti sorprendentemente moderne. Oggi i contributi scientifici e teoretici di Mivart a biologia, evoluzione dei primati e antropologia vengono raramente menzionati. Tuttavia molti dei suoi concetti hanno riecheggiato negli scritti di molti importanti biologi del ventesimo secolo. La storia delle scienze biologiche potrebbe ottenere benefici da una conoscenza più profonda dell'influenza di Mivart.
The Historical Controversy of Localizationism in the Brain and the Challenge of a Holistic View in Neuroscience
José Ángel Lombo (Pontificia Università della Santa Croce)
Between the end of eighteenth century and the beginning of nineteenth century, there was a remarkable development of medical studies about the connection between biology and psychology to explain human behavior. These investigations were specifically related to the anatomy of brain functions. An important step in this development was the position of Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828), who proposed that different regions of the cerebral cortex controlled specific functions of our behavior (“localization” theory). In opposition to him, Pierre Flourens (1794-1867) underlined that no discrete areas of the brain, but all of them participate in every mental function (“aggregate field” theory). For several years to some extent the position of Flourens prevailed . Nevertheless, many other clinical evidences progressively supported the idea of the division in the brain and more specifically the cerebral cortex in different areas related to specific functions (e. gr. Broca and Wernicke, for the neurobiological organization of language).
Three problems arose from this dispute. First and most evidently, the difficulty of localizing with precision the concrete functions in the brain. Secondly, the possibility of establishing a causal connection between the different areas of the brain and our behavior. And third, the challenge of placing in the brain all or some psychological activities, and no longer in the soul. This last point especially had considerable religious consequences, since the spiritual soul was considered up to that moment as an immaterial subject of such activities. With his “holistic” proposal, Pierre Flourens attempted to contrast the possible materialism of the localization theory. Even if many posterior evidences apparently demolished his views, nowadays it seems quite accepted that the brain works as a whole, even if in a complex way and through the specific intervention of concrete areas.
On the Bio-Logic of Life Sciences
Marta Bertolaso (University Campus Bio-Medico of Rome)
In this paper I analyse how new explanatory categories emerge from the tension between a reductionist and systemic accounts of inter-level regulatory processes. Cancer research will be used as case study. Recent publications in this field, in fact, are bringing to the forefront of scientific and philosophical reflection the question about the nature of the scientific understanding when dealing with such complex dynamics.
The thesis I will defend is that the relationship between the epistemological and ontological aspects of the traditional debate on Reductionism in Philosophy of Life Sciences can be overcome by understanding the nature of the explanatory categories we need in order to explain how different levels of the organismic biological organization interact, i.e. how their reciprocal dependency works. This implies revising and expanding the traditional notion of causes in the Philosophy of Science and moving towards relational categories.
Outline
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Introduction
- Explanations, Mechanisms, Systems
- Reductionists vs Anti-Reductionists
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Cancer Research: explaining the origin of cancer
- Conceptual Issues
- Explanatory Issues
- What is really at stake?
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On the Bio-Logic of Life Sciences A Relational Ontology of Levels
- Epistemological Implications
- Ontological Assumptions
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Disentangling the Reductionist vs Anti-reductionist Debate
- On Systems' notion
- Reciprocity and Asymmetry in Causal Accounts
- Conclusions: What Naturalism is Possible?
Main References
• Weinberg RA (2014) Coming Full Circle - From Endless Complexity to Simplicity and Back Again, Cell, 157: 267-271.
• Bertolaso M (2013) How Science Works – Choosing Levels of Explanation in Biological Sciences, Aracne s.r.l., Roma
• Bertolaso M (2014) Why it has been so difficult to pin down with a definition of nature. In “Rethinking Nature”, Teoria, 34(1): 75-92.
• Bertolaso M (2015) “A System Approach to Cancer. From Things to Relations”, in Green, S. (ed.), Philosophy of Systems Biology: 5 Questions. Copenhagen: Automatic Press, in press.
The Impact of Religious Worldviews on Kelvin’s Physical Insights: Thermodynamics and the Age of the Earth
Javier Sánchez Cañizares (Universidad de Navarra)
Thermodynamics developed as a new branch of physics in the 19th century, helping to go beyond a purely mechanistic understanding of nature. Among its founding fathers, it is William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) who offers a most promising perspective in order to highlight the influence of religious views in the improvement of science. In particular, I will focus on the controversy about the age of the Earth—which confronted Kelvin with many geologists and defenders of the theory of evolution—and I will explain the connections between Kelvin’s credo and his scientific attack on uniformitarianism. Kelvin’s contribution, even if ultimately proven wrong, was right in spirit and served the transition from qualitative to quantitative geology.
Some Philosophical Grounds in the Mathematical Theories of Cantor and Gödel
Philippe Dalleur (Pontificia Università della Santa Croce)
Driven by the desire to understand God’s Infinity, Cantor’s has revolutionized the mathematics with his Set Theory, especially the way we are thinking of infinities. The transfinite aleph-0 and other infinities has opened up a new research in the philosophy of Logic and of formal languages, which allowed the production of binary computers as practical instances of Türing machines. Gödel showed that those logical systems are intrinsically incomplete and cannot account for the truth or falsity of all their propositions.
But are those limitations and these human produced machines or languages, the only way to reach a logical knowledge of the truth? Can we reduce the human or even God’s knowledge to them, as some argue? After presenting some religiously driven philosophical ideas of Cantor and Gödel, I will try to show their interest in the current debates on the existence of God and the way we should understand notions of infinity and of logical minds.
I presupposti religiosi e filosofici della fisica di Max Planck
Valeria Ascheri (Pontificia Università della Santa Croce)
Fino a pochi mesi prima della morte (1947), Max Planck, pur provenendo da una famiglia di pastori luterani, dichiarò di non essere credente e soprattutto di non credere nel Dio personale dei cristiani, ma, nel contempo, si definiva profondamente religioso, tanto che negli ultimi anni della sua vita scrisse alcuni saggi e fece alcune conferenze dedicate al rapporto tra religione e scienza (Religion und Naturwissenschaft).
Inoltre, anche se Planck è conosciuto soprattutto come scienziato di fama internazionale e di assoluto valore per i suoi studi e le sue scoperte nel campo della fisica dei quanti, è altrettanto nota ed evidente la riflessione filosofica che fonda e anima tutta la sua attività di scienziato e in particolare alcuni principi di carattere metafisico che sembrano proprio guidare e, in qualche caso, anche ostacolare le sue ricerche e le sue scoperte all'interno della nuova fisica nascente.
Sono molti gli elementi extra-scientifici che invitano ad uno studio più approfondito del suo pensiero: la ferma convinzione, in polemica con il neopositivismo e Mach, che la scienza debba avere necessariamente dei presupposti metafisici e che l'uomo non si possa limitare ad uno studio puramente fenomenico e privo di una prospettiva o di un riferimento che ne spieghi il significato e fornisca un'immagine del mondo; il serio e costante lavoro da "cercatore della verità" nella certezza che la scienza può arrivare a scoprire 'veramente' alcuni aspetti della realtà (realismo); la fiducia che nella natura ci sia un ordine, articolato nelle leggi di natura (e in particolare mostrato nelle costanti fondamentali, come la h da lui scoperta); infine, l'idea che sia possibile rintracciare il fondamento che dia una spiegazione unica dei fenomeni fisici, in sintonia con la ricerca di una teoria del tutto che unifichi le forze che agiscono in fisica.
Pur tuttavia, è noto anche come Planck fu molto restio ad accettare la teoria dei quanti ‒ perché sembrava andare contro la semplicità e l'ordine deterministico garantito dal meccanicismo e portava elementi di disordine e incertezza nella spiegazione dei fenomeni ‒ tanto da diventare un "caso" ed essere definito il "rivoluzionario più riluttante di tutti i tempi" da Lakatos e Musgrave nel saggio Critica e Crescita della conoscenza (1984). Ma, proprio quando lo scienziato comprese che, per spiegare un fenomeno come quello del cosiddetto "corpo nero", doveva accettare e sostenere la sua scoperta del quanto d'azione "h", anche a costo di provocare lo smantellamento della fisica classica, allora la sua adesione fu definitiva, perchè lo scopo della scienza è conoscere la verità, ossia spiegare la natura quale è essa è.
Nello studiare la visione filosofico-religiosa di Planck sono sorte alcune domande: anzitutto se il percorso della sua riflessione, personale e scientifica, è stato dalla filosofia alla fisica o viceversa (nei suo scritti non è evidente, anzi ci sono affermazioni contrastanti), e inoltre quale sia stata l'influenza e il ruolo della fede cristiana sull'autore e, più in generale, come è inteso il rapporto tra scienza e religione dallo scienziato.
Quantum Mechanics: on the EPR experiment
Gennaro Auletta (Pontificia Università Gregoriana)
The EPR thought-experiment represents a unicum in the history of science. What is extraordinary is that in a single paper very different components are connected:
- A philosophical-metaphysical one (notions of causality and reality),
- A logical one (the argument has the structure of an inference based on a XOR),
- A physical-theoretical one (the aim is to prove that quantum mechanics is incomplete)
- A physical-experimental one (this is done on the basis of a proposed experiment).
A paper of such a complexity was never published before (and up to date nothing can be compared with it) and in fact is likely to be the most influential scientific paper never published.
I shall analyze the 4 aspects above and show the reasons of this impact on the scientific community.
Theological Roots of Scientific Realism and its Persistence in Contemporary Physics
Francisco José Soler Gil (Univertität Bremen and Universidad de Sevilla)
The attitude of a large majority of the physicists is realistic: They believe that their successful models describe approximately the actual structure of the world. This attitude is rooted in the theological and philosophical movement that gave birth to modern science. But the fact is that the current philosophical climate is very different from the climate that reigned at the beginning of modern physics. So the question arises of whether scientific realism can now rely on other theoretical bases, or we should rather expect the evolution of physics towards a non realistic science. In this presentation are reviewed the mentioned points; it is furthermore discussed how a non realistic physics might look like, and finally some recent cases are addressed that may indicate this new impulse toward a non realistic physics.
La actitud ampliamente mayoritaria de los físicos es realista: Consideran que sus modelos exitosos describen aproximadamente la estructura real del mundo. Esta actitud hunde sus raíces en el movimiento teológico-filosófico que dio origen a la ciencia moderna. Ahora bien, lo cierto es que el clima filosófico actual es muy diferente del que reinaba al inicio de la física moderna. De manera que se plantea la pregunta de si el realismo científico puede ahora apoyarse en otras bases teóricas, o si más bien debemos esperar la evolución hacia una ciencia no realista. En esta ponencia se repasan los puntos mencionados, se discute cómo podría ser una física no basada en el realismo, y finalmente se apuntan también algunos casos recientes que podrían ser indicativos de ese nuevo impulso hacia una física no realista.